

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

MEMO TO: Timothy J. Dwyer, Technical Director
FROM: Matthew Duncan and Rory Rauch, Pantex Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Report for Week Ending October 9, 2009

Video Cameras: B&W submitted a project plan to PXSO for a project to install a new Closed Circuit Television System. This proposed general plant project would install video cameras in all nuclear explosive facilities for the use of first responders in the event of an emergency, allowing a visual assessment of the situation in the facility prior to entry. The refresh rate would be low, no audio would be provided, and they would not be monitored continually. The video cameras are not intended to supplement conduct of operations oversight or event reconstruction. This project has not been funded, but is projected to cost between \$3.5 and \$7.5 million and take 43 months to complete.

System Engineering: PXSO performed an assessment of B&W's System Engineering program and noted that a staffing shortage identified in last year's assessment continues to worsen. Last year, eight Cognizant System Engineers were lost. The staffing analysis for the System Engineering Department indicates that 13 additional engineers are required above current levels. As a result of the high turnover and staff shortage, the Cognizant System Engineering functions required by DOE Order 420.1B, *Facility Safety*, will be increasingly difficult to perform. According to the assessment, several job postings to fill vacancies have been delayed or deferred. PXSO has asked B&W to provide a response to this finding in 30 days.

Specific Administrative Controls (SACs): In response to a query from DOE headquarters regarding commitments in the implementation plan for Recommendation 2002-3, PXSO noted that it had assessed all SACs currently credited in the Documented Safety Analysis during the last fiscal year. DOE's Office of Environment, Safety and Health Evaluations (HS-64) also reviewed a sample of SACs. Based on these results, PXSO believes that SACs are effectively developed and implemented at Pantex. PXSO plans to periodically assess SACs in the future and has incentivized B&W to perform a self assessment of SAC implementation this fiscal year.

Surge Suppression System: PXSO recently assessed this safety class design feature. The identified deficiencies and weaknesses included: several units were not properly labeled, a required unit in a special purpose bay was not on the daily and annual In-Service Inspection data sheets, and the Technical Safety Requirements applicability matrix incorrectly omitted the control for one facility. The assessment also found that the applicable Design Information Summary (similar to a System Design Description) had not been revised in about five years and that several sections had been left blank. PXSO has asked B&W to respond to the identified weaknesses in 30 days.

Corrective Actions: PXSO has identified several issues with the Cause Analysis/Mistake Proofing (CAMP) exercises that were held in response to a tooling event on the W62 program (see 6/17 report) and the discovery of equipment in a nuclear explosive facility that had not been evaluated for its electrical threat potential (see 4/24 report). The original CAMP for the tooling event did not capture all potential causes and corrective actions, and the corrective actions were not completed by the specified date. This CAMP has since been re-performed to PXSO's satisfaction. Regarding the electrical equipment issue, though B&W established prompt remedial measures in April, a comprehensive set of corrective actions from the CAMP were not established until September. PXSO has directed B&W to perform a self assessment of the Corrective Action Program as a part of the Fiscal Year 2010 Contractor Assurance System.